Appealing a Wildfire Act Drone Conviction: R. v. Leippi and the Legal Meaning of “Interference”

In R. v. Leippi (2026 BCPC 26), the Provincial Court convicted a recreational drone operator under s. 56(2)(d) of the Wildfire Act. The trial judge treated the Crown’s burden as proving that the accused operated a drone (as “equipment” / a “machine”) in a manner that interfered with government fire control being carried out under the Act, without lawful excuse.

What happened (in brief)

The incident arose during the Kelowna wildfire in August 2023. Mr. Leippi was on a boat near the Okanagan Lake Resort using a small drone to record fire damage. He became aware of a helicopter bucketing water nearby and lowered the drone to hover close to the water.

Conservation officers approached and directed him to move his boat away. He complied, but the drone remained airborne. On a return pass, the helicopter pilot noticed the drone, testified that it irritated and distracted him, and tried twice to douse it with water before resuming bucketing. The judge accepted the pilot’s evidence that cockpit distraction is operationally significant and found the pilot spent a few minutes attempting to eliminate the drone due to a perceived risk to the helicopter. The judge concluded those minutes constituted interference with fire control and convicted.

The legal frame at trial

The Court held s. 56(2)(d) is a regulatory strict‑liability offence. The Crown did not need to prove intent to interfere. Once the Crown proved the prohibited act and the “interference” element, the accused could avoid liability only by proving a recognized defence—principally due diligence / mistake of fact—on a balance of probabilities. (The Wildfire Act itself expressly recognizes due diligence, mistake of fact, and officially induced error as defences to a prosecution under the Act.)

On the facts, the due‑diligence defence failed largely on notice and reasonable steps: the judge rejected the claim that Mr. Leippi was unaware of active firefighting, and found that once a helicopter with a bucket and longline was operating nearby—and certainly once officers told him to move—he should have immediately retrieved the drone rather than keeping it in flight.

Why this conviction is appeal‑interesting

Two features make Leippi worth watching for appellate counsel:

  1. “Interference” is doing real work. The reasons record the Crown’s position that “interference” in this provision had not been judicially considered to date. The judge adopted an operationally sensitive approach: a few minutes of cockpit distraction/lost time, grounded in perceived flight‑safety risk, was enough.
  2. Due diligence is treated as demanding once the operator is on notice. The reasons leave very little room for “I tried to stay low and out of the way” once active fire control is apparent. Whether the due‑diligence analysis applied the correct legal yardstick (reasonable steps vs. perfection) is at least arguable as a legal issue, depending on how grounds are framed.

The statutory appeal route (and why it is not the usual “Criminal Code route”)

Because this is a conviction under a provincial statute, the first appeal proceeds under British Columbia’s Offence Act, not the Criminal Code appeal provisions for Criminal Code convictions.

First appeal: Supreme Court of British Columbia

  • Offence Act s. 101 defines the “appeal court” (for ss. 102–114) as the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
  • Offence Act s. 102(1)(a) gives a defendant a right to appeal to the Supreme Court:
    • from a conviction or order, and/or
    • against sentence.
  • Offence Act s. 103 sets the default hearing location (nearest Supreme Court sittings) with discretion to change venue on application.

Powers of the appeal court

This is where the framework becomes “hybrid”:

  • Offence Act s. 109(1) imports Criminal Code ss. 683–689 (except s. 686(5)) into Offence Act appeals. Practically, that’s what gives the Supreme Court the familiar appellate toolkit and disposition options.
  • Offence Act s. 109(3) allows the Supreme Court to order that the appeal be heard by way of a new trial if the condition of the trial record (or another reason) makes that the better “interests of justice” route.
  • Offence Act s. 111 permits dismissal for want of prosecution where notice has been given and the appeal has not been proceeded with or has been abandoned; s. 112 governs costs.

Further appeal: Court of Appeal (leave; question of law alone)

  • Offence Act s. 124(1) permits a further appeal, with leave, only on a question of law alone, from:
    • a Supreme Court decision on an Offence Act appeal, or
    • a Supreme Court decision on a stated case.

Deadlines and mechanics: how the appeal is commenced and moved forward

1) Notice of appeal: 30 days, six copies, Form 3

Offence Act s. 104(1) ties the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court criminal rules. Under Criminal Rules (SI/97‑140), Rule 6(2), a defendant commences an appeal by:

  • filing six copies of a Form 3 notice of appeal
  • within 30 days after the pronouncement of the order under appeal, or
  • within 30 days after sentence where a sentence has been imposed.

Rule 6 also requires an address for service and provides that filing constitutes service on the Attorney General of British Columbia, with the clerk forwarding a copy to the prosecutor.

2) Transcripts and reasons: move quickly

Under Rule 6(5)–(7), the appellant must generally:

  • within 14 days after serving the notice, provide proof transcripts were ordered; and
  • for conviction appeals (order other than sentence), generally file transcripts and reasons within 45 days after serving the notice (and deliver a copy to the respondent), subject to directions and exceptions.

3) Hearing date and written argument

  • Rule 6(9) requires obtaining a hearing date on filing the notice.
  • Rule 6(11) prohibits setting a hearing date more than six months after filing without leave.
  • Rule 6(14) sets the standard written‑argument schedule for conviction appeals: appellant at least 30 days before hearing; respondent at least 14 days before.

Extensions

  • Offence Act s. 104(2) allows the Supreme Court to extend the time for notice of appeal.
  • Rule 6(25) allows a judge, on Form 6 and only where necessary in the interests of justice, to extend or shorten Rule 6 timelines (even after expiry).

A sentencing/recognizance note

Depending on the sentence, Offence Act ss. 105–107 impose custody/recognizance/deposit requirements for conviction appeals. Paying a fine does not, by itself, waive the right of appeal.

How I would structure a defence appeal in Leippi

A viable appeal has to be honest about deference: a pure “re‑trial in writing” is rarely persuasive. The best grounds are those that can be framed as legal error (or an error in legal test), not just disagreement with findings.

Ground 1: the legal threshold for “interference”

The trial judge equated interference with a few minutes of cockpit distraction and operational time loss, accepted as risk‑driven.

A defence appeal can ask whether “interference with fire control” in s. 56(2)(d) requires a more objective operational impact than distraction plus a reactive choice—especially where the operation did not formally shut down and the aircraft was not grounded. That is a statutory‑interpretation question capable of appellate review as a question of law.

The Crown answer will be powerful: wildfire aviation is high‑risk; any unauthorized drone that distracts a pilot is interference by its nature; and the legislative purpose is preventative.

The defence reply, if it is to have traction, should not minimize drone risk. The sharper argument is that “interference” should require a sufficiently direct operational nexus and not collapse into subjective irritation. In Leippi, the trial court treated the pilot’s response as risk‑based; that finding is a major obstacle that a defence appeal must address directly.

Ground 2: due diligence: did the court apply “reasonable steps,” or drift into perfection?

Because this is strict liability, the accused bears the onus to prove due diligence on a balance of probabilities. The reasons treat “notice + continued flight” as fatal: once the helicopter and enforcement directions were apparent, immediate retrieval was the reasonable step.

A defence appeal could test whether the due‑diligence analysis properly applied the legal standard of reasonableness in the moment (especially where the drone was already airborne and the operator was simultaneously complying with directions to move). This ground is uphill because the reasons articulate concrete “reasonable person” steps the accused allegedly failed to take.

Remedy

If a legal error is shown and the remaining findings cannot support guilt under the correct standard, an acquittal is possible. If the error is intertwined with factual findings (or the record is inadequate), a new trial is the more realistic outcome: potentially through the Offence Act’s “appeal by way of new trial” mechanism.

Stated case: an alternative route with a built‑in trap

The stated case route is available for error of law or excess of jurisdiction (Offence Act s. 115), with a recognizance requirement (s. 116) and default timelines (including the “30 clear days” application window where no Supreme Court Civil Rule applies).

But Offence Act s. 123 provides that where a party is entitled to a s. 102 appeal, proceeding by stated case is deemed to abandon the s. 102 appeal right. In most defence files, that makes stated case an exceptional tool rather than the default.

Takeaway

Leippi is a clear warning shot in the drone‑and‑wildfire context: the Court treated a few minutes of cockpit distraction and risk‑response time as statutory “interference” with government fire control, and it applied due diligence in a way that leaves little room for continued flight once firefighting activity is apparent.

If this conviction is appealed, the most credible path is to frame “interference” as a genuine threshold question of statutory meaning and operational causation, and to test whether due diligence was assessed using the correct legal standard.

This post is for information and discussion among legal professionals and is not legal advice.