Article snapshot
- Focus
- Criminal Defence, Competency
- Summary
- R. v. Puttonen, 2026 BCSC 320, is a useful reminder that criminal-law competence is not just substantive law and advocacy. It also includes disciplined court management, timely applications, proper attendance, and candour when a matter is set to proceed.
- Primary issue
- counsel competence, delay and disruption of proceedings, duties to the court, adjournment procedure, remote attendance, counsel withdrawal
- Jurisdiction
- British Columbia, Canada
- Court / tribunal
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Case / matter
- R. v. Puttonen
- Citation / file no.
- 2026 BCSC 320
- Statute / rule
- Supreme Court Criminal Rules
- Who this helps
- criminal defence lawyers, litigators, trial counsel, appellate counsel, referring lawyers, accused persons
- Key takeaway
- In serious criminal litigation, competence includes logistics and procedural discipline; good legal theory does not cure poor court management.
Competence Is More Than Knowing the Law: What R. v. Puttonen Teaches Criminal Litigators
Competence in criminal practice is often discussed in terms of doctrine, cross-examination, and Charter litigation. R. v. Puttonen, 2026 BCSC 320, is a reminder that competence also includes the unglamorous disciplines that keep a serious case on the rails: calendar control, proper attendance, timely applications, and candour to the court. Importantly, Puttonen is not a merits decision on the underlying charges. It is a show-cause decision about counsel conduct, and the court framed it expressly in terms of lawyers’ duties to the court and the pressure that delay places on already strained criminal trial resources.
The procedural failures were stark. The accused was required to attend in person. One or both defence counsel were required to attend in person. That did not happen. One lawyer appeared late by video without prior authorization, launched into an adjournment request without a proper written application, could not explain why the accused was absent, and then attempted an ad hoc application to get off the record. The court later stressed that the governing rules required a written notice of application and that remote attendance was not something counsel could simply assume would be permitted.
The most important part of the case is not the result. It is the finding. Fitzpatrick J. concluded that the conduct was undertaken for the sole purpose of postponing the voir dire and trial for scheduling reasons, not for any legitimate purpose. The court held that the conduct rose above mere discourtesy, reflected indifference, and was calculated to delay and disrupt the proceeding and undermine the administration of justice. That is a serious judicial finding, even though contempt convictions were ultimately not entered.
That is why Puttonen matters. It is not just a contempt case. It is a competence case.
It also contains a practical point that litigators ignore at their peril: Crown consent is not court authorization. One reason the court ultimately declined to convict was that the Crown had effectively agreed to proceed with the voir dire only on January 7 and had cancelled the witness for January 6. Another was that the matter unexpectedly resolved the next day in a way that led to a stay in Supreme Court. A sincere apology from one lawyer also mattered. But Fitzpatrick J. expressly said that Crown consent to an adjournment or video attendance does not equate to the court granting one. The court retained its own duty to insist that the case proceed.
For practitioners, the lessons are straightforward. If a trial or voir dire date is set, clear it personally. If you are double-booked, bring the issue forward early and properly. If an application is foreseeable, bring it in writing and on notice. If in-person attendance is required, do not treat remote appearance as automatic. If something has gone wrong, explain it candidly, apologize promptly, and repair it. And if you remain counsel of record, you remain responsible until the court removes you. Puttonen is a useful reminder that good legal theory cannot rescue bad court management.
For clients and referring counsel, that point matters. Complex criminal litigation requires more than good legal ideas. It requires disciplined preparation, procedural accuracy, and reliability when the court is ready to proceed. That is especially true in serious jury matters, Charter litigation, and trial-readiness work, where the law and the logistics are equally important.
Questions this post answers
What does R. v. Puttonen say about competence in criminal practice?
It shows that competence includes more than legal knowledge and advocacy. Counsel must also manage dates properly, attend as required, bring applications correctly, and deal candidly with the court when problems arise.
Does Crown consent to an adjournment or remote appearance amount to court approval?
No. A central practical lesson from Puttonen is that Crown agreement does not replace judicial authorization. The court retains control over its own process and may insist that the matter proceed.
Why is Puttonen important even though contempt convictions were not entered?
Because the value of the case lies in the court’s reasoning about counsel obligations, delay, and disruption of proceedings. The decision is a warning about how seriously courts may treat procedural indifference in criminal matters.
Who should care about this case?
Any criminal litigator handling trials, voir dires, Charter applications, or serious scheduled proceedings should care. It is also relevant to clients and referring counsel assessing whether defence counsel can manage complex matters reliably.